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In the 1960s and 1970s, many African governments had macroeconomic, sectoral and trade 
policies that increasingly favored urban employees at the expense of farm households, and 
favored the production of importable goods at the expense of exportables (Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdes 1988, 1991; Thiele 2004). Similar biases were also prevalent elsewhere, but 
rarely to the same extent as in Africa. The magnitude of pro-urban (anti-agricultural) and also 
pro-self-sufficiency (anti-trade) intervention matters greatly for economic development, 
because agriculture is the main employer for the poor and in Africa is often a key export 
sector. Changes in the magnitude of these biases could help explain Africa’s development 
experience, including the continent’s slow pace of poverty alleviation and economic growth.  
Indeed, since the 1980smuch progress has been made in reducing the anti-agricultural and 
anti-trade biases of policy in Africa, and these changes have been associated with faster 
economic growth and poverty alleviation. However, many price distortions remain. With 60 
percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce still employed in agriculture and more than 80 
percent of the region’s poorest households depending directly or indirectly on farming for 
their livelihoods (World Bank 2007, Chen and Ravallion 2007), agricultural and trade 
policies remain key influences on the pace and direction of change in Africa. 
  This volume summarizes a set of case studies measuring distortions within and across 
countries over time. It is part of a global research project seeking to improve our 
understanding of agricultural policy interventions and reforms in Asia, Europe’s transition 
economies, and Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Africa.
1 We make no attempt to 
summarize the voluminous literature on policy and economic growth in Africa (the most 
recent major continental study being Ndulu et al. 2008), let alone the literature dealing with 
public investment or economic growth strategies more broadly (addressed recently by Spence 
et al. 2008). Our goals are more narrowly defined. One purpose of the project is simply to 
compare quantitative indicators of past and recent agricultural price policies. A second 
                                                 
1 The other three regional studies are Anderson and Martin (2008), Anderson and Swinnen (2008), and 
Anderson and Valdés (2008). Together with the present volume and comparable studies of high-income 





objective is to help describe the political economy behind these interventions in different 
national settings. Our third purpose is to use this evidence to explore the prospects for further 
policy reforms and their potential effects. 
  The foundation of this project is a new set of annual time series estimates for 
protection and taxation of farmers over the past half century. Comparisons over time, across 
commodities and among countries are used to help address such questions as the following: 
Where is there still a policy bias against agricultural production? To what extent has there 
been overshooting, in the sense that some developing-country food producers who were taxed 
are now being protected from import competition, along the lines of such policy transitions 
seen earlier in Europe and Northeast Asia? 
Beyond the data themselves, we ask what political and economic circumstances can 
help explain the policies chosen by governments? What explains the pattern of distortions 
within the agricultural sector of each country? What are the political economy forces behind 
reform, and how do successful reformers differ from other countries? In particular, how 
important are domestic political factors relative to international forces, such as loan 
conditionality, multilateral trade agreements through the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional integration agreements, 
and the globalization of supermarkets or other trading firms? How has the balance of forces 
shifted over time?  
Looking forward, our goal is to draw appropriate lessons from past experience, so as 
to facilitate the adoption of more growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing policies in Africa 
and elsewhere. The study is timely for at least four reasons. One immediate use for the 
findings is in trade negotiations. African and other developing countries have been more 
engaged in the WTO’s  Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations than in any previous 
GATT round, and the resulting diversity of interests has made it more difficult for WTO 
members to reach consensus. More information on agricultural and trade policies in these 
countries can inform dialogue between members. More information can also assist African 
countries seeking to position themselves favorably in preferential trade negotiations, notably 
the new Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union. Another immediate 
need is for policies to respond to changing technologies, such as the information, 
communication, agricultural-biotechnology and supermarket revolutions. A third source of 
urgency is to meet the United Nations-encouraged Millennium Development Goals by 2015, 
with agricultural policy being central to the alleviation of hunger and poverty. And last but 





and governments in some developing countries, in their panic to deal with the inevitable 
protests from consumers, have reacted in far from optimal ways. Such spikes have occurred 
in the past, most notably in 1973-74, and lessons as to what policy responses work better than 
others can be drawn from that set of experiences. 
Including Africa in this study is crucial for several reasons. First, the continent is 
home to many of the world’s poorest people. In 2006 Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for less 
than 2 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and exports and just 4 percent of 
agricultural GDP, but it also accounted for 12 percent of the world’s farmers, 16 percent of 
agricultural land, and 28 percent of those living on less than US$1 a day (World Bank 2008). 
Second, it is the region where agricultural growth has been slowest over the past half-century, 
especially on a per capita basis. And third, it is where sectoral and macro (including exchange 
rate) policies have been most heavily interventionist and slowest to reform, dampening the 
contribution of market incentives to economic growth. There is thus much to be learned from 
examining the policy history of the region, and there is great potential for poverty alleviation 
if market-friendly, growth-enhancing policies were to be adopted and the recent large 
increase in development assistance funds were to be used wisely to complement and 
strengthen market forces. 
The African part of this study is based on a sample of 21 developing countries. It 
includes Egypt, the largest and poorest country in north Africa, plus five countries of eastern 
Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda), five countries in southern Africa 
(Madagascar, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe), five large economies in 
west Africa (Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal), and five smaller 
economies of west and central Africa for which cotton is a crucial export (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali and Togo, for which we estimate price distortions for just cotton and four 
nontraded food staples). In 2000–04 these economies (leaving aside Egypt) together 
accounted for around 90 percent of the agricultural value added, farm households, total 
population and total GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa. Estimates of distortions are provided for as 
many years and products as data permit over the past five decades (an average of 43 years), 
and for an average of 9 crop and livestock products per country which in aggregate amounts 
to about 70 percent of the value of their agricultural production. The time series, product and 
country coverage greatly exceed that of the earlier study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 
(1991), which focused on just 3-5 crops during the 1960-84 period in only 2 North African 





  Our 21 focus economies in Africa accounted for only 1.3 percent of worldwide GDP 
but 11 percent of the world’s farmers in 2000-04. These and related shares are detailed in 
table 1.1, which reveals the considerable diversity within the region in terms of stages of 
economic development, resource endowments, trade specialization, poverty incidence and 
income inequality. The countries are also very diverse in political and social development 
terms, and thus provide a rich sample for comparative study.  
The extent of poverty decline in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since 1981 has been 
disappointing relative to other developing country regions. The number of SSA people living 
on less than $1/day (in 1993 PPP terms) grew from 168 million in 1981 to 252 million by 
1993 and 298 million by 2004. As a percent of the population, the number of people in such 
extreme poverty has declined over the past decade from its peak of 48 percent in 1996 to 41 
percent by 2004 – but that is only marginally below the 42 percent level of 1981. More than 
two-thirds of that decline in poverty incidence over the past decade or so has been in rural 
areas, while most of the rest is explained by the rural poor moving to urban centers (where 
many are still very poor). The African experience contrasts strongly with that of Asia, where 
even in South Asia the proportion of the population living on less than $1 a day has fallen 
from one-half to less than one-third (table 1.2). 
Policy choices have played an important role in the rates of economic growth, 
structural change and poverty alleviation observed in Africa. Many countries had increasingly 
severe anti-agricultural and anti-trade biases in the 1960s and 1970s, with subsequent reforms 
that varied widely in terms of starting date, speed and extent of policy change. The switch to 
policies that are less biased against farmers and trade began in some countries by the late 
1970s but in many others only in the 1980s or even later – and the transition is still on-going, 
often with periods of stalling and even reversals (the most notable recent example being 
Zimbabwe). Agricultural price distortions are not the only target of policy reform of course, 
but they are a key aspect of economic policy in most African countries.   
This chapter begins with a brief summary of economic growth and structural changes 
in the region since the 1950s and of agricultural and other economic policy developments as 
they affected the farm sector at the time of and in various stages after independence from 
colonial powers. It then introduces the methodology used by the authors of the individual 
case studies to estimate the nominal rate of assistance (NRA), the corresponding consumer 
tax equivalent (CTE) facing the buyers of agricultural products, the relative rate of assistance 
(RRA) between the farm and nonfarm sectors, and the international trade bias index (TBI). 





studies in this volume, without attempting to also survey the myriad policy changes that are 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The final sections summarize what we 
have learned and draw out implications of the findings, including for poverty and inequality 
and for possible future directions of policies affecting agricultural incentives in Africa. 
 
 
Growth and structural changes in Africa 
 
 
The recent report of the Commission on Growth and Development (Spence 2008) notes that 
13 economies have had sustained growth in real per capita income of more than 7 percent for 
at least 25 consecutive years since World War II. Nine of those are East Asian and only one 
is African, namely tiny Botswana (population: 2 million). Between 1980 and 2004, per capita 
GDP for our 21 focus countries of Africa grew at just 0.7 percent per year, half the global 
average of 1.4 percent and a small fraction of Asia’s 5.5 percent, so per capita incomes in 
Africa have been diverging away from those of richer countries, especially those in Asia. 
Agricultural GDP growth was faster in Africa than for the world as a whole (3.2 compared 
with 2.0 percent per year), but only marginally so when expressed on a per capita basis (0.6 
compared with 0.5 percent). In the earlier 1965-84 period, Africa’s agricultural GDP growth 
rate had been just 1.5 percent (World Bank 1986).   
Within Africa, economic growth and structural change experiences across countries 
are quite diverse (table 1.3). Over time, Africa’s export volumes grew at relatively slow rates 
compared with the global average of 6.1 percent (last column of table 1.3), causing the 
region’s share of global exports to halve. However, as economies have gradually opened up, 
the share of exports in GDP has reversed its decline and begun rising in several African 
countries (table 1.4).  
  Slow economic growth has allowed only modest restructuring of Africa’s economies 
away from agriculture and towards other activities. In nearly three-quarters of our focus 
countries the farm sector’s share of GDP is still above 25 percent, the same number as in the 
latter 1980s (table 1.5). The share of overall employment accounted for by farming activities 
has fallen but generally remains above 50 percent (table 1.6), much higher than the GDP 
shares. These data underscore the relatively low incomes of farmers, and hence the continued 





  Agriculture’s share of merchandise exports (table 1.7) has declined at least a little in 
virtually all African countries. This is partly because of rises in other primary exports such as 
petroleum in Sudan, partly because of growth in exports of manufactured goods as for 
example in Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal, and partly because production is increasingly 
consumed locally. The declining relative importance of farm exports has been less rapid in 
Africa than in the rest of the world, however, as the index of revealed agricultural 
comparative advantage (defined as the share of agriculture and processed food in national 
exports as a ratio of the share of such products in worldwide merchandise exports) has risen 
in most of our focus countries (table 1.8). The exceptions have newly exploited mineral or 
energy deposits. The overall trend is a slight decline in the export orientation of primary farm 
production. In the 1960s the region was 120 percent self-sufficient in farm products, but since 
then that indicator has declined to around 105 percent. The share of farm production exported 
has fallen from nearly 20 percent to just 8 percent, and the share of imports in domestic 
consumption of farm products has doubled, from 2 to 4 percent (table 1.9). 
  The trends in growth and development described above are closely linked to the 
agricultural policies pursued by African governments. To measure these policies in a 
comparable way, a common methodology was adopted by the authors of the country case 
studies in this volume (and its companion volumes listed in note 1). A summary of that 
methodology follows, and further details can be found in Anderson et al. (2008) which is 
reproduced as Appendix A in this book. 
    
 
Methodology for measuring rates of assistance and taxation 
 
 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is defined as the percentage by which government 
policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the 
government’s intervention. Similarly, the consumer tax equivalent (CTE) is the percentage by 
which policies have raised prices paid by consumers of agricultural outputs. Negative values 
imply net taxation of farmers, or subsidies to consumers. The NRA and CTE will be identical 





the same point in the value chain, but in general there will also be some domestic producer or 
consumer taxes or subsidies to differentiate them.
2  
The intended use of NRAs and CTEs influences the methodology needed to estimate 
them. This project uses NRAs and CTEs for three purposes. One is simply to compare the net 
effect of policies on prices and incentives across a wide range of commodities, countries and 
years. For this purpose, the methodology needs to be both simple and flexible. Another 
purpose is to allow aggregation to indicate the total extent of transfer to (or from) farmers and 
consumers due to agricultural price policies, for which appropriate weights and denominators 
are needed. This function is similar in spirit to the OECD (2007) producer and consumer 
support estimates (PSE and CSE), but with important differences in implementation as 
outlined below. And the third purpose is to enable economic modelers to use the NRAs and 
CTEs in policy simulation models, which requires allocating each distortion to a particular 
policy instrument such as import tariffs, export taxes, or domestic producer or consumer 
taxes or subsidies. 
Estimating the NRA or CTE for an individual industry requires specialist knowledge 
of that sector, particularly in countries where trade costs are high, pass-through along the 
value chain is affected by imperfect competition, and markets for foreign currency have been 
distorted at various times and to varying degrees in the past. Specialist knowledge is also 
needed as to how policy is actually implemented. Most distortions in markets for tradable 
goods come from trade measures, such as a tariff (or occasionally a subsidy) imposed on the 
c.i.f. import price or an export tax imposed on the f.o.b. price at the country’s border, or 
quantitative restrictions on trade. These are captured in the NRA and CTE at the point in the 
value chain where the product is first traded. To estimate the NRA for a typical farmer, 
authors of the country studies estimated or guessed the extent of pass-through back to the 
farm gate, and added any domestic farm output subsidies. To obtain the CTE for a typical 
consumer, they also added any product-specific domestic consumer taxes or subsidies to the 
distortion from border prices. Note that the NRA and CTE differs from the OECD’s PSE and 
CSE in that the latter are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price and hence will be 
                                                 
2 Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and includes 
any policy measure at a country’s border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative restriction on trade, or a 
dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, assuming the country is small enough to have no monopoly 
power in international markets), or any domestic producer or consumer tax/subsidy/restraint on output, 
intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where needed to directly overcome an externality, 
or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, for example as a value added tax to raise government 





lower (for positive protection rates) than the former which are expressed as percentages of the 
undistorted price.
3  
We decided against seeking estimates of the more complex effective rate of assistance 
(ERA) even though it is, in principle, a better partial equilibrium single measure of distortions 
to producer incentives than the nominal rate. The reason is that to do so requires knowing 
each product’s value added and various intermediate input shares of output. Such data are not 
available for most developing countries even every few years, let alone for every year in the 
long time series that is the focus of this study. And in most countries distortions to farm 
inputs are very small compared with distortions to farm output prices. But where there are 
significant product-specific distortions to input costs, they are captured by estimating their 
equivalence in terms of a higher output price and including that in the NRA for individual 
agricultural industries wherever data allow (as is also done as part of the calculation by the 
OECD of its PSE). Any non-product-specific distortions, including distortions to farm input 
prices, are also added into the estimate for the overall sectoral NRA for agriculture as a 
whole. 
NRA and CTE estimates were made for each of the country’s major farm products, in 
an attempt to cover at least 70 percent of the total gross value of farm production at 
undistorted prices. This target degree of coverage is similar to that for the OECD’s PSEs. 
Unlike the OECD, however, in this project we do not routinely assume that the nominal 
assistance for covered products would apply equally to non-covered farm products. This is 
because in developing countries the agricultural policies affecting the non-covered products 
are often very different from those for the chosen covered products. For example, 
nontradables among non-covered farm goods (often highly perishable or low-valued products 
relative to their transport cost) are often not subject to direct distortionary policies. The 
authors of the country case studies were asked to provide three sets of ‘guesstimates’ of the 
NRAs for non-covered farm products, one each for the import-competing, exportable and 
nontradable sub-sectors. Weighted averages for all agricultural products were then generated, 
using the gross values of production at unassisted prices as weights. For countries that also 
provide non-product-specific agricultural subsidies or taxes (assumed to be shared on a pro-
rata basis between tradables and nontradables) or assistance decoupled from production, such 
net assistance is then added to product-specific assistance to get an NRA for total agriculture, 
                                                 
3 Some analytics and empirical evidence regarding the appropriate choice of denominator are provided in 





and also for tradable agriculture for use in generating the Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA, 
defined below).   
How best to present regional aggregate NRA and RRA estimates depends on the 
purpose for which the averages are required. We generate a weighted average NRA for 
covered products for each country, by multiplying each NRA by that product’s share of the 
gross value of production, valued at the farm-gate equivalent undistorted prices.
4 To get the 
NRA for all agriculture, we then add the NRA for non-covered products and any non-
product-specific assistance to farmers. When it comes to averaging across countries, each 
polity is an observation of interest, so a simple average is meaningful for the purpose of 
political economy analysis. For other purposes, however, a value-weighted average is 
appropriate. Finally, we compute and use a weighted average that includes only the tradables 
part of agriculture – including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that 
require only light processing before they can be traded – by assuming that its share of non-
product-specific assistance equals its weight in the total. We denote this measure for tradable 
agriculture as NRAag
t. 
In addition to these average NRAs, it is important to provide also a measure of its 
dispersion or variability across products. The welfare cost of a distortion varies exponentially 
with its size, so that a set of dispersed tariffs is more costly than a uniform tariff at the same 
average level. The cost of dispersion is even larger when there is a greater degree of 
substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). Land and labor is often specific to agriculture but 
highly transferable among farm activities, so we expect variation of NRAs across farm 
products to be quite costly. A simple indicator of this kind of dispersion is the standard 
deviation of the NRA among covered products.  
Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, 
or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so that it is 
possible to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of 
tradables. Those NRAs are used to generate a trade bias index, TBI, defined as: 
(1)    TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1 
                                                 
4 Corden (1971) proposed that free-trade volume be used as weights, but since they are not observable (and an 
economy-wide model is needed to estimate them) the common practice is to compromise by using actual 
distorted volumes but undistorted unit values or, equivalently, distorted values divided by (1+ NRA). If estimates 
of own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are available, a partial equilibrium estimate of the 
quantity at undistorted could be generated, but if those estimated elasticities are unreliable this may introduce 





where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a single number the extent to 
which the typically anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in agricultural policies changes over time.  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also, albeit indirectly 
via changes to factor market prices and the exchange rate, by the incentives nonagricultural 
producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance 
that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) proved his 
Symmetry Theorem that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an 
export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing 
nontradables, to a model with imperfect competition, and regardless of the economy’s size 
(Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). If one assumes that there are no distortions in the markets for 
nontradables and that the value shares of agricultural and non-agricultural nontradable 
products remain constant, then the economy-wide effect of distortions to agricultural 
incentives can be captured by the extent to which the tradable parts of agricultural production 
are assisted or taxed relative to producers of other tradables. By generating estimates of the 
average NRA for non-agricultural tradables, it is then possible to calculate a Relative Rate of 
Assistance, RRA, defined in percentage terms as: 
(2)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the tradable 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be 
less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (assuming 
NRAnonag
t is positive). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. 
This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally 
comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti- (pro-
)agricultural bias. 
Exchange rate distortions generated by dual or multiple exchange-rate regimes are 
considered when calculating NRAs and CTEs, following the methodology outlined in 
Appendix A. These have been important in many African countries, particularly during the 
1970s and 1980s, making their estimated (typically) positive NRAs for importables and 
(typically) negative NRAs for exportables larger than they otherwise would have been.  
Dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation are obtained from 
multiplying the NRA estimates by the gross value of production at undistorted prices, to 
obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the direct gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to 





any or all products to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the studied economies. 
These GSE values are calculated in constant dollars, and are also expressed on a per-farm-
worker basis. 
  To obtain comparable dollar value estimates of the consumer transfer, the CTE
 
estimate at the point at which a product is first traded is multiplied by consumption (obtained 
from the FAO’s supply and utilization database) valued at undistorted prices to obtain an 
estimate in constant US dollars of the tax equivalent to consumers of primary farm products 
(TEC). This too is added up across products for a country, and across countries for any or all 
products, to get regional aggregate transfer estimates for the covered farm products of our 
focus countries.  
 
 
Estimates of policy-induced distortions in Africa 
 
 
We begin with the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, then compare them with the 
nominal rates for non-agricultural tradables by calculating the relative rates of assistance. 
Dollar equivalents of assistance/taxation to farmers are also presented, and so too are the 
consumer tax equivalents of policies as they affect buyers of farm products in each country 
(which includes domestic processors). 
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
 
Agricultural price, trade and exchange rate policies have reduced the earnings of African 
farmers quite substantially.
5 The average rate of taxation as measured by our weighted 
average NRA was less than 10 percent at the time many Africa countries achieved 
independence in the early 1960s, but then rose sharply during the 1960s and 1970s as 
interventions became more severe. Reforms have since reduced the average extent of taxation 
to below its level of the early 1960s, including a a brief period in the late 1980s when a 
combination of policy reforms and low international commodity prices brought the weighted 
average NRA to near zero (table 1.10). Such averages hide considerable diversity within the 
                                                 
5 Recall that our sample covers around 90 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy.  For North Africa, the 
sample includes only Egypt, which accounts for almost half the population of North Africa but only 37 percent 





region, however. A visual impression of the variation across countries and the extent of 
reforms between 1975-79 and 2000-04 is provided in figure 1.1, showing clearly the major 
reduction in taxing of farmers in such countries as Ghana,Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, 
Senegal and Madagascar. That figure also shows the transition from taxation to support of 
farmers in Mozambique and Kenya, as well as the transition from slight support to slight 
taxation in Nigeria, and the continuing heavy degree of taxation still in Cote’d’Ivoire, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
One important type of variation in distortions is the within-country dispersion of 
product NRAs, as measured in table 1.11 by their standard deviation around the weighted 
mean NRA for covered agricultural products in each period. This dispersion was highest in 
the middle of our 50-year period, when the NRAs were most distorting, but even after the 
recent reforms it is no lower than it was at the beginning of the period. The dispersion of 
NRAs within  African countries is an important target for reform, whatever the level of 
average NRA. 
Variation among products has a somewhat similar pattern across countries. Figure 1.2 
shows the pattern of dispersion in the region-wide average NRA among the key farm 
commodities in the late 1970s and a quarter-century later, both unweighted and weighted by 
value of production. As in other regions of the world, assistance is among the highest for the 
rice pudding ingredients of sugar, rice and milk, and is most negative for tropical cash crops 
such as coffee, cotton, cocoa and tobacco. The dispersion over a wider range of products and 
the full time period is summarized in table 1.12. 
A third type of variation is cross-country diversity of national average NRAs. This is 
evident from the bottom of table 1.10: NRA averages for the agricultural sector became more 
similar between the latter 1950s and the early 1970s, then less similar through to the latter 
1980s, and then more similar again so that by 2000-04 this type of dispersion was back to 
what it had been in the early 1960s.  
  The fourth important type of variation is differential treatment of import-competing 
and exportable products, in a way that often favors self-sufficiency. The extent of anti-trade 
bias is shown in figure 1.3, as the gap between the average NRAs for import-competing and 
exportable products. This gap grew from the 1950s through to the 1980s. It has since 
narrowed again, due mainly to changes in taxation of exportables, but the gap is still sizeable. 
This is summarized in the Trade Bias Index (TBI) reported for Africa as a whole in the 





Decomposing the NRA into components reveals a subtle but important influence on 
the aggregate average. The final ‘exportable share’ row of table 1.14 shows that, since the 
late 1970s, the share of tradable farm products that are exportables has fallen from two-thirds 
to just over one-half (from 67 to 54 percent). Many governments tax trade in both directions, 
with negative NRAs for exportables and positive NRAs for importables, so the changing 
composition of African agriculture from exportable to importable helps drive the aggregate 
NRA towards zero. This compositional effect adds to the changes within the exportables and 
import-competing subsectors illustrated in figure 1.3.   
Another important decomposition of the average NRA is provided in table 1.15, 
showing the contribution of domestic input subsidies, output taxes or subsidies, and border 
measures. In the African context, product-specific input price distortions contributed very 
little to the sectoral NRA estimates, so that in many cases the case-study authors reported no 
values at all. Interventions in domestic markets also contributed relatively little. Most of the 
region’s measured NRA is due to border measures, largely trade taxes, quantitative trade 
restrictions and the operations of parastatal trading companies. 
In aggregate, the total value of taxes on farming has been substantial. Africa’s anti-
agricultural bias in NRA terms peaked in the late 1970s, but the sector has grown and so in 
constant (2000) US dollars the total value of annual transfers from farmers has risen from 
around $2 billion in the early 1960s (taking account of the fact that NRAs were available for 
only four-fifths as much agricultural production then as from 1980) to $10 billion in the 
1970s, and back to around $6 billion in the 1980s (ignoring the mid-1980s period when 
international prices were at record lows), 1990s and 2000-04 (see bottom row of table 
1.16(a)). The distribution across countries is shown in figure 1.4, where it is clear that the 
major transfers in recent years have been from farmers in Ethiopia and Sudan in the east, 
Zimbabwe in the south, and Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria in the west. What is also clear from 
that figure is how much decline there has been since the latter 1970s in such transfers, 
particularly in Egypt and Tanzania but also in many smaller African economies. For Africa as 
a whole, the latest estimate is equivalent to a gross tax of $40 per year for each person 
engaged in agriculture, down from more than three times that amount in the 1970s (bottom 
row of table 1.16(b)), but still larger than government investment or foreign aid targeted to 
agriculture (Masters 2008, Figure 9). As shown in table 1.17 and figure 1.5, the burden of 
taxation was imposed mainly through the three major export cash crops (cocoa, coffee and 





crops are still the main source of transfer from agriculture, while sugar and milk have become 
positively assisted. 
In summary, the level and dispersion of agricultural NRAs confirm that there has been 
substantial reform towards less distortion of incentives. However, they also suggest that there 
are still many opportunities for policy changes that would be both pro-poor and pro-growth, 
raising income for low-income farmers and improving resource allocation within and 
between countries.   
 
Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
 
The anti-farm policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural policies, but also to 
policies affecting mobile resources engaged in other sectors. For example, to the extent that 
protection to manufacturing also has declined over time, the relative burden on agriculture 
has diminished even more than the agricultural NRA suggests.   
The results of this study aim to capture inter-sectoral effects through using the NRA 
also on non-agricultural products to generate the relative rate of assistance (RRA) between 
farm and nonfarm activities. The case studies were far more focused on agricultural policy, 
and their NRAs for the nonfarm sector typically were measured using data on applied trade 
taxes rather than price comparisons. As a result, unlike for farm NRAs the estimated nonfarm 
NRAs usually do not include the effects of quantitative trade restrictions which were 
important in earlier decades but have been relaxed in recent times. The nonfarm NRAs also 
do not capture distortions in the services sectors, some of which now produce tradables or use 
resources that are mobile between sectors. We can therefore be confident that the estimated 
NRAs for non-farm activities are smaller and decline less rapidly than in fact was the case, 
and that our RRA estimates understate the past level of anti-farm bias. 
Even though the estimates of the NRA for non-farm tradables should be considered 
lower-bound estimates, they turn out to be nonetheless quite large. Their unweighted average 
among the African focus countries rose from around 12 percent in the 1960s to 27 percent 
during 1975-84 before declining to around 15 percent during the most recent decade or so. As 
a result, the unweighted RRA is lower and dips even more (to -42 percent) in the middle of 
the studied period than does the NRA for agriculture, before returning at the end of the period 
to around the -20 percent is was in the early 1960s (figure 1.6(a)).  
The ten half-decade RRAs and their two component NRAs for each country are 





latter 1970s is provided by figure 1.7. Even after the reforms since the 1980s only three of 
those countries had a set of incentives in 2000-04 that was neutral as between agriculture and 
other tradable sectors, namely South Africa, Mozambique and Kenya. But none other than 
Zimbabwe has a worse set of intersectoral distortions now than in the 1970s.  
 
Comparisons across regions and countries 
 
Trends in agricultural NRAs and in intersectoral RRAs for Africa, Asia and Latin America 
are summarized in figure 1.8, showing that other regions have had similar – but even steeper 
– trends over most of the past four decades. These similarities suggest that common political 
economy forces might be at work. Indeed, the tendency for agricultural NRAs and RRAs to 
be positively correlated with per capita income and revealed comparative advantage in trade 
(see Anderson 1995) is confirmed statistically even in Africa (but less so than in Asia and 
Latin America – see Ch. 1 of Anderson and Martin 2008 and Anderson and Valdés 2008) in 
the simple regressions with country fixed effects shown in figure 1.9, and with the multiple 
regressions with country and time fixed effects shown in table 1.19. 
Looking across countries, we can ask whether policy changes have helped make the 
international location of production more or less efficient over the past five decades? To 
answer that question well, these NRA data should be analyzed using a global computable 
general equilibrium model. Until then, a crude approach is to examine the standard deviation 
of RRAs across the economies of the region over time. That indicator suggests distortions 
became more dispersed across African countries up to the 1980s, but less so thereafter: it 
averaged around 30 percent during 1955-79, nearly 45 percent during the 1980s, but has since 
gradually fallen to 20 per cent during 2000-04 (final row of table 1.18). 
 
Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
 
The extent to which farm policies alter the retail prices of food, livestock feed or inputs into 
processing industries depends on various intervening factors, including the extent of 
competition along the value chain. For simplicity, like the OECD (2007), we ask only how 
policies affect buyers at the point on the value chain where the farm product is first traded 
internationally, where comparisons can most directly be made between domestic and 
international prices (e.g., as milled rice, or raw sugar). Then, to sum up CTEs across 





FAO food balance sheets. In the case of minor products, we proceed indirectly by using FAO 
value of trade data and assuming the undistorted value of consumption is production valued 
at undistorted prices plus imports minus exports.  
If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions so that 
the NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax or 
restriction, and there were no domestic consumption taxes or subsidies in place, then the CTE 
would equal the NRA for each covered product. But such domestic distortions are present in 
several African countries. Also, the value of consumption weights used in getting the CTEs 
are quite different from the value of production weights used for getting weighted average 
NRAs (both measured at undistorted prices). Hence the average CTEs are quite diferent from 
the average NRAs for numerous countries, particularly those exporting cash crops in order to 
import staple foods. This can be seen by comparing the country and product CTEs in table 
1.20 with the corresponding NRAs in tables 1.10 and 1.12. Nonetheless, the weighted 
average CTE for the region has moved much like the NRA: starting at around -10 percent at 
the time of independence, falling to -17 percent (that is, a 17 percent consumer subsidy 
equivalent) by the early 1970s, and then gradually lessening and eventually reaching close to 
zero (with a blip in the latter 1980s when Egypt overshot in its reform efforts to reduce the 
suppression of domestic food prices just when the international price of food fell to record 
low levels). The variance in both national CTEs within countries and in product CTEs across 
countries also rose before the reforms and fell after the latter 1980s (see table 1.20(a) and (b) 
including the bottom row of each).  
In dollar terms the subsidies to consumers of farm products in Africa are largest in 
Sudan and Ethiopia while the tax on consumers historically has been largest in Nigeria and 
South Africa. Egypt prior to its reforms in the 1980s was also a huge subsidizer of food 
consumers. The transfer on average from producers to consumers in the region amounted in 
2000-04 to around $1.7 billion per year, which is only one-third (when expressed in 2000 US 
dollars) the annual average transfer in the 1970s (table 1.21(a)). Among the covered products, 
the diversity in measures across the continent means that there are no obvious stand-out 
products (table 1.21(b)), unlike in other regions where the biggest transfers are from 
consumers to producers of milk, rice and sugar.  
 






A visual picture of the overall finding – that distortions have been reduced substantially since 
the 1970s – is provided in figure 1.10. That figure shows values of agriculture’s trade bias 
index (TBI) on the horizontal axis and relative rate of assistance (RRA) on the vertical axis. 
An economy with no anti-agricultural bias (RRA = 0) and no anti-trade bias within the farm 
sector (TBI = 0) would be located at the intersection of the two axes in the upper right-hand 
corner. In 1975-79, South Africa was the only economy anywhere near that point, and most 
other Sub-Saharan African economies were far to the southwest of it. In 2000-04, by contrast, 
Kenya and Nigeria were also close to that neutrality point, and all the other countries shown 
were far closer than they were in the 1970s. This is not to say there are few distortions left 
within the agricultural sector though, because RRA and TBI values in the ranges -20 to -40 
and -0.2 to -0.4, respectively, are not small – and because within most countries’ agricultural 
sector there is still a wide dispersion of product NRAs. Note also from Figure 1.10 that the 
2000-04 values fit roughly along a 45-degree line, as the tax burden on agriculture in these 
countries consists primarily of taxes on trade.   
 
International spillovers and multilateral agreements 
 
Our distortion estimates take each country’s border prices as given, but in reality each 
country’s policies do have some small effect on other country’s prices. An import restriction 
that raises domestic prices will lower prices elsewhere, and an export tax that lowers 
domestic prices will raise them elsewhere. In addition, attempts by one country to stabilize its 
domestic prices over time will reduce the stability of international prices. As a result, each 
country’s openness to trade contributes to an international public good, offering other 
countries more favorable and often more stable border prices. This is a classic collective 
action problem, calling for a multilateral agreement to lock in freer trade policies.   
Collective action to stabilize world prices is precisely what was sought during the 
GATT’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, via tariff bindings and disciplines on 
administered domestic prices. Tariff bindings can reduce the extent of spillovers by 
restricting the range over which tariffs can increase in response to low prices. But WTO 
bindings are now so far above applied import tariffs that this discipline on food-importing 
members in years of low international prices is very weak. The most recent stage of the Doha 
round of WTO-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations broke down in mid-2008 because 
many developing countries were calling for policy space in the form of a Special Safeguard 





richer members including the United States were not willing to sanction in a new agreement. 
Moreover, there is no corresponding GATT/WTO discipline on food export restrictions, 
which – as 2008 has starkly revealed – can be the problem in years of high international 
prices.    
Africa’s share of world trade is so small that its policies contribute relatively little to 
the collective-action problem described above, except to the extent that African governments 
have sided with such countries as Indonesia and India in demanding special safeguards and 
thereby delayed or prevented the emergence of a new WTO agreement. As the victim rather 
than perpetrator of international agricultural-policy spillovers, however, Africa could benefit 
greatly from a more effective system of multilateral trade rules. International agreements may 
also help African governments undertake reforms that would not otherwise be possible, 
allowing them to make commitments and assemble coalitions that cannot otherwise be 
sustained. The details of WTO and other international agreements are outside the scope of 
this book, but generally our results regarding national policies suggest that multilateral 
agreements can help each government deliver more favorable market conditions for 
agricultural development at the very least by limiting the rise of import restrictions in other 
countries. In addition, following the imposition by numerous food-exporting developing 
countries in 2008 of export restrictions that harmed food importers, perhaps WTO members 
may eventually agree to limit export restrictions as well. 
  
Summary: What have we learned? 
 
Each of the case studies presented in this volume provides detailed insights into Africa’s wide 
variety of country experiences. Aggregating their results to characterize all of Africa 
necessarily obscures as much as it reveals. Making generalizations is sometimes useful, 
however, if only to allow comparison with other regions, and to detect common trends that 
cannot be seen in individual cases. Averaging over the 21 African countries considered in this 
study, our principal findings are the following. 
African governments have removed much of their earlier anti-farm and anti-trade 
policy biases. Government policy biases against agriculture had worsened in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, primarily through increased taxation of exportable products. Reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s reversed that trend, and average rates of agricultural taxation are now back to or 





Substantial distortions remain, and still impose a large tax burden on Africa’s poor. 
In constant (2000) US dollar terms, the transfers paid by farmers in our 21 focus countries 
peaked in the late 1970s, at over $10 billion per year or $134 per farm worker. In 2000-04 the 
burden of taxation averaged $6 billion per year, or $41 per person working in agriculture. 
However, even this lower amount is appreciably larger than public investment or foreign aid 
into the sector. This continuing taxation in Africa contrasts with both Asia and Latin 
America, where the average agricultural NRAs and RRAs had risen all the way to zero by the 
early 21
st century, and from lower levels than in Africa (although, like Africa, those other 
regions still have a wide dispersion of NRAs across products and countries within their 
regions). 
African farmers have become less taxed in part because of the changing trade 
orientation of African agriculture. Reduced taxation of farmers has occurred in part because 
of a decline in the share of output that is exportable and a corresponding rise in the share 
from import-competing agricultural industries. That sub-sector’s rate of protection from 
imports has fluctuated but remains positive. 
Trade restrictions continue to be Africa’s most important instruments of agricultural 
intervention. Domestic taxes and subsidies on farm inputs and outputs, and non-product-
specific assistance, are a small share of total distortions to farmer incentives in Africa. As a 
result, policy incidence on consumers tends to mirror the incidence on producers, with fiscal 
expenditures playing a much smaller role than in more-affluent regions.  
Differences in NRAs and RRAs across commodities and countries are still substantial. 
Dispersion rates, as measured by the standard deviation in NRAs and RRAs across 
commodies and countries, rose and then fell with the average degree of intervention in the 
decades each side of the 1970s. Looking forward, whatever the overall level of taxation or 
assistance, moving towards more uniform rates within the farm sector and between countries 
within the region could still yield substantial increases in efficiency of resource use.   
 
 
Where to from here? 
 
 
Every reader of this volume will draw their own conclusions as to what these findings imply 
about the future of agricultural policy in Africa, and wide variations in NRAs among 





governments will continue to reduce taxation of agricultural exports, improve market 
institutions and invest in rural public goods, and will see producers respond in ways that 
generate faster economic growth and sustained poverty alleviation. That has been the pattern 
in other regions, and African countries have shown their willingness and ability to begin 
these changes.  
Our hopes are tempered by experience, however, including particularly the experience 
of agricultural policy transition in other regions. A fundamental concern in agricultural policy 
over time as economies join the middle-income group is ‘overshooting’. In response to rural 
poverty and inequality, many countries start protecting agriculture soon after they stop taxing 
it.
6 This imposes large costs on consumers, and slows national economic growth. Countries 
that lock in relatively efficient and equitable policies as soon as they are attained can 
therefore enjoy a high payoff relative to those that allow farm support policies to become 
increasingly costly over time. In particular, policies that raise the prices of staple foods 
impose serious costs on the urban poor and on rural net buyers of these products, as has been 
demonstrated by recent increases in their prices for other reasons (Ivanic and Martin 2008).   
Rural-urban poverty gaps can be addressed in far more efficient ways than by 
subsidizing production or raising food prices. For example, rural poverty can and has been 
alleviated in parts of Africa and Asia by the mobility of some members of farm households 
who work full- or part-time off the farm and repatriate part of their higher earnings back to 
those remaining on the farm (Otsuka and Yamano 2006, World Bank 2007). Concerted 
government interventions through targeted social policy measures can also be an efficient and 
effective way to reduce gaps between rural and urban incomes and raise national incomes 
overall (Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). Efficient ways of assisting the left-behind 
groups of poor (nonfarm as well as farm) households include public investment measures that 
have high social payoffs such as basic education and health, rural infrastructure and 
agricultural research and extension.   
The rest of this volume contains a collection of analytical narratives of the policy 
experiences of 21 African countries over the past half-century, each illustrated by detailed 
quantitative estimates of the extent of distortions to farmer incentives. While they bring new 
empirical evidence to bear on many common concerns, they inevitably also raise new 
questions. Among the most important are: What impact have past and recent policies had on 
economic welfare, agricultural prices, income inequality and poverty? Why did governments 
                                                 





intervene in the ways they did, especially when some of those means were grossly inefficient 
and inequitable? More in-depth empirical analysis is now possible, thanks to the provision of 
the distortion estimates reported here and in the three companion volumes cited in note 1. 
Some early findings from such analyses will appear in the project’s forthcoming books. For 
example, Anderson, Valenzuela and van der Mensbrugghe (2009) provide results from a 
global economy-wide model of the impacts on agricultural markets, national economic 
welfare and net farm incomes of distortions to the world’s goods markets as of 2004. How 
those distortions – both own-country and rest-of world’s – impact on the extent of poverty 
and inequality are explored in a series of country case studies in Anderson, Cockburn and 
Martin (2009), using global and national economy-wide models that are enhanced with 
detailed earning and spending information of numerous types of urban and rural households. 
And in Anderson (2009b) a broad range of theoretical and econometric analyses are brought 
together in an attempt to shed more light on the political economy forces that generated the 
evolving pattern of inter- and intra-sectoral distortions to farmer and food consumer 
incentives over the past half-century. Our hope is that the results from these studies will 
spawn many more such analyses in the years to come. We hope too that these comparative 
analyses will help African governments to adopt more successful policies, allowing African 
countries to achieve faster economic growth, poverty alleviation and improved living 
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Figure 1.1: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, individual African focus countries and 
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Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 





Figure 1.2: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered product, African focus countries, 1975-




(a) unweighted average across 21 countries 
 




































a average across 21 countries 
 






























Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 
a. Weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices, with each 
NRA (by country, by product) is weighted by the country’s value of production of that 





Figure 1.3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a agricultural 























(b) weighted averages across 16 countries  




















Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and importable averages because 





Figure 1.4: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, African focus countries,
a 1975-79 and 2000-04 


























   Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 
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1975-79 2000-04Figure 1.5: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in Africa, by product, 1975-79 
and 2000-04 
(constant 2000 US$ million) 
 





























Figure 1.6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a Africa region, 1955 to 2004 
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Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-





Figure 1.7: Relative rates of assistance to agriculture,
a African focus countries
b and 











































Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 




Figure 1.8: Nominal and relative rates of assistance,
a Asia, Africa and Latin America,
b 1965 









































Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 
a. 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.  
b. In Asia, estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of 
assistance to agriculture in those earlier years was the same as the average NRA estimates for 




Figure 1.9: Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, and 
agricultural NRA and RRA,
a African focus countries, 1955 to 2005   
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a.  Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as a 
fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable is the natural log of real GDP 





Figure 1.9 (cont.): Relationships between real GDP per capita, comparative advantage, and 
agricultural NRA and RRA,
a African countries, 1960 to 2004 
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Sources: Based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) (which draws on estimates 
reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book) and in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007).  
a. Dependent variable for regressions is NRA or RRA by country and year, expressed as a 
fraction. Results are OLS estimates. The explanatory variable revealed comparative 
advantage, which is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio 
of that sector’s share of global exports. 




Figure 1.10: Relationship between RRA and the trade bias index for agriculture, African 
focus countries, 1975–79 and 2000–04 
a.  1975–79 
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Table 1.1: Key economic and trade indicators, African focus countries, 2000-04  
  Share (%) of world:  National rel. to 
world (=100) 
























Benin   0.12  0.01  0.09  7  55  1034  na  31  39 
Burkina Faso   0.19  0.01  0.09  5  111  953  na  29  40 
Cameroon    0.25  0.03  0.38 13 74  445  na  15  45 
Chad    0.14  0.01  0.07 5  695  na na na  na 
Cote d’Ivoire   0.28  0.04  0.21  12  139  722  na  18  48 
Egypt   1.13  0.26  1.11  23  6  175  na  2  34 
Ethiopia   1.08  0.02  0.23  2  58  958  na  12  30 
Ghana   0.33  0.02  0.2  6  88  748  na  17  41 
Kenya   0.52  0.04  0.29  8  103  636  na  12  43 
Madagascar   0.28  0.01  0.1  5  202  670  0.94  63  47 
Mali   0.2  0.01  0.1  5  353  624  na  39  40 
Mozambique   0.3  0.01  0.08  4  324  359  -0.03  30  47 
Nigeria   1.98  0.15  1.09  8  73  3  na  71  44 
Senegal    0.17  0.02  0.09 10 94  444  na  13  41 
South Africa   0.73  0.42  0.39  59  275  134  0.52  9  58 
Sudan    0.55  0.05  0.5 8  490  209 na na  na 
Tanzania   0.58  0.03  0.33  5  166  800  0.73  56  35 
Togo    0.09 0  0.05 5  80  407 na na  na 
Uganda   0.42  0.02  0.15  4  60  938  0.8  83  46 
Zambia   0.18  0.01  0.07  7  398  194  0.35  60  51 
Zimbabwe   0.21  0.04  0.14  18  200  602  0.83  62  50 
African focus countries  9.73  1.21  5.74  13  145  na  na  na  na 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  9.37  0.98  4.93  10  164  na  0.55  41  na 
All  North  Africa  2.34  0.70  2.81 30 84 na  -0.78  na  na 
All Africa  11.7
1
1.67 7.74  14  148  na  0.20  32  na 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled mainly from World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. 
a. Revealed Comparative Advantage = share of agriculture and processed food in national 
exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports 
 
b. Primary Agriculture Trade Specialization = (X-M)/(X+M), 2000-02 (world av =0).
 c. 
Percentage of population living on <US$1/day, from Chen and Ravallion (2007).  
d. Gini Indices for the most recent year available between 2000 and 2004 in the World 




Table 1.2: Poverty in Africa, Asia and the world, 1981 to 2004 
 
 1981 1990 1996 2004 
No. of people (million):   
Sub-Saharan Africa  168 240 286 298 
  
East Asia  796 476 279 169 
South Asia  455 479 453 446 
  
WORLD 1470 1248 1109 969 
  
% of population   
Sub-Saharan Africa  42 47 48 41 
  
East Asia  58 30 16 9 
South Asia  50 43 36 31 
  
WORLD 40 29 23 18 
 




Table 1.3: Growth of real GDP and exports, African focus countries, 1980 to 2004 
 
(at constant 2000 prices, percent per year, trend-based) 
 







Benin    5.4 4.3 2.6 3.7 0.3 0.6 
Burkina Faso   3.8  2.5 4.0 3.7  0.8   1.2 
Cameroon   3.4  0.4 -0.2 1.2  -1.4   2.5 
Chad   3.7  4.3 3.2 3.9  0.9   3.5 
Egypt   3  4.7 5.1 4.6  2.4   5.0 
Ethiopia   1.8  1.3 4.5 2.9  0.2   4.7 
Ghana   2.6  3.6 6.6 4.1  1.3   7.0 
Kenya   2.3  2.5 3.5 3.0  -0.1   4.1 
Madagascar   2.1  1.6 1.3 1.6  -1.4   2.1 
Mali   3.3  5.6 2.5 3.3   0.6   8.1 
Mozambique   4.2  7.7 6.4 4.4  2.3   7.7 
Nigeria   3.7  1.6 5.6 3.1  0.4   3.0 
Senegal   2.1  4 2.9 2.9  0.2   4.5 
South Africa   1.4  0.5 2.3 1.7  -0.5   3.7 
Sudan   4.9  4.6 3.5 4.3   1.9   4.3 
Tanzania   3.6  5.0 4.0 3.8  1.1   6.2 
Togo   3.9  1.7 1.2 2.1  -1.1   0.3 
Uganda   3.6  9.3 6.9 5.9  2.4   8.9 
Zambia   2.5  -0.4 1.4 1.0  -1.6   1.1 
Zimbabwe   2.3  0.3 2.3 1.9   -0.6   6.0 
African focus countries  3.2  2.6 3.5 3.1  0.7  4.4 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  3.6  1.7 2.9 2.7  0.1  na 
All North Africa  na  na na 3.9  1.8  na 
All  Africa  na na na 3.7 na na 






Table 1.4: Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, African focus countries, 
1975 to 2004 
(percent) 
  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Benin   8 21 21 27 27   22 
Burkina Faso   6 7 7 6 na  9 
Cameroon   25 13 13 20 25  na 
Chad   11 14 14 13 na  na 
Egypt   22 22 22 24 16  18 
Ethiopia   na 9 9 7 14  18 
Ghana   32 19 19 19 28  40 
Kenya   28 23 23 31 24  24 
Madagascar   15 15 15 17 22  24 
Mali   12 15 15 18  24   29 
Mozambique   na 5 5 13 15  26 
Nigeria   35 37 37 46 42  42 
Senegal   33 24 24 22 30  29 
South Africa   31 23 23 22 23  27 
Sudan   9 5 5 5 7   15 
Tanzania   na 9 9 14 17  17 
Togo   27 29 29 25 33  35 
Uganda   na 7 7 7 11  13 
Zambia   40 36 36 31 32  24 
Zimbabwe   22 23 23 26 na   na 
African focus countries  na 21 21 23 na  na 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  na 21 21 23 na  na 
All North Africa  38 23 23 28 na  na 
All Africa  na 22 22 25 na  na 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s World 




Table 1.5: Sectoral shares of GDP, African focus countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 Agriculture  Industry  Services 
  65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 65-69 75-79 85-89 00-04 
Benin    42 33 34 36 11 14 13 14 48 53 52 50 
Burkina  Faso    34 29 28 32 21 23 21 18 45 48 51 50 
Cameroon    32 31 23 43 20 19 30 17 49 51 46 40 
Chad    38 37 33 40 13 13 14 14 49 49 53 46 
Egypt    25 24 19 15 24 27 27 32 51 49 54 53 
Ethiopia    na na 47 41 na na 13  9 na na 40 50 
Ghana    43 56 48 36 19 16 17 25 38 29 35 39 
Kenya    33 32 27 26 17 17 16 15 50 51 57 59 
Madagascar    22 29 31 27 13 15 12 14 65 57 57 59 
Mali    59 55 42 34 10 10 15 24 32 36 43 42 
Mozambique    na na 44 21 na na 18 26 na na 39 52 
Nigeria    49 29 36 25 12 33 32 48 39 38 32 27 
Senegal    25 26 21 18 12 15 18 20 63 59 61 62 
South  Africa    9  6  5  3 36 40 38 29 55 54 57 68 
Sudan    36 34 33 39 14 12 16 20 50 54 52 41 
Tanzania    na na na 41 na na na 15 na na na 44 
Togo    44 29 33 39 22 23 22 20 34 49 45 41 
Uganda    46 71 53 31 12  6 10 19 41 22 37 50 
Zambia    12 15 15 20 57 40 44 24 31 45 41 57 
Zimbabwe    20 16 15 14 28 31 29 19 52 53 55 67 
African focus 
countries  na na na 17 na na na 29 na na na 54 
All Sub-
Saharan  Africa na na na 18 na na na 28 na na na 54 
All North 
Africa  18 12 13 na 36 46 39 na 47 42 49 na 
All Africa  na na na na na na na na na na na na 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s World 




Table 1.6: Agriculture’s shares of employment, African focus countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
 1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 2000-04 
Benin   82 71 65 52 
Burkina Faso   92 92 92 92 
Cameroon   86 77 71 58 
Chad   93 89 85 74 
Egypt   63 58 45 33 
Ethiopia   na na na 82 
Ghana   61 61 60 56 
Kenya   86 83 80 75 
Madagascar   85 82 79 74 
Mali   93 90 87 80 
Mozambique   87 85 84 81 
Nigeria   72 59 46 32 
Senegal   83 81 78 73 
South Africa   33 21 15 9 
Sudan   81 74 70 60 
Tanzania   91 87 85 80 
Togo   76 70 66 59 
Uganda   91 88 85 79 
Zambia   81 77 75 68 
Zimbabwe   78 74 69 62 
Africa focus countries  na na     na  56 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  na na     na  61 
All North Africa  62 54 41 30 
All Africa  na na     na  56 




Table 1.7: Sectoral shares of merchandise exports, African focus countries, 1965 to 2004 
(percent) 
  Agriculture and  
processed food 

























Benin    88 84 na 92  4  2 na  0  8 11 na  8 
Burkina  Faso    95  92  na  85 1 0  na 2 4 8  na  13 
Cameroon    80 81 57 40 14 13 26 55  6  6 16  5 
Chad    96 83 na na  2  9 na na  1  8 na na 
Egypt    71 44 20 16  6 30 50 45 24 26 30 33 
Ethiopia    na na na 86 na na na  2 na na na 12 
Ghana    80 83 na 67 17 14 na 18  1  2 na 15 
Kenya   na 65 71 57 na 20 16 21 na 15 13 23 
Madagascar    87 83 80 60  6 10  9  6  7  7 10 33 
Mali    97  91  99  55 1 0  na 8 2 9 1  36 
Mozambique    na na na 32 na na na 62 na na na  5 
Nigeria    60 6 3 0  37  94  96  98 2 0 0 2 
Senegal    83 61 49 40  9 28 26 23  8 12 25 36 
South  Africa   na 26 na 12 na 20 na 25 na 35 na 58 
Sudan    98  96  93  19 1 3 1  77 1 1 6 3 
Tanzania   na 83 91 71 na  4 na 10 na 13  8 18 
Togo    57 37 41 36 36 55 50 16  7  7  8 48 
Uganda    na 97 na 84 na  3 na  7 na  0 na 10 
Zambia    3  1 na 17 97 98 na 69  1  1 na 14 
Zimbabwe   na na 51 53 na na 19 19 na na 29 28 
 







Table 1.8: Index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA Index) in agriculture and 
processed food,
a African focus countries, 1965 to 2004 
(world = 1.0) 
 1965-69  1975-79  1985-89  2000-04 
Benin   3.5  4.5  na  10.3 
Burkina Faso   3.8  4.7  na  9.5 
Cameroon   3.2  4.2  3.9  4.5 
Chad   3.8  4.1  na  na 
Egypt   2.8  2.3  1.4  1.8 
Ethiopia   na  na  na  9.6 
Ghana   3.2  4.3  na  7.5 
Kenya   na  3.4  4.8  6.4 
Madagascar   3.4  4.3  5.4  6.7 
Mali   3.8  4.7  6.9  6.2 
Mozambique   na  na  na  3.6 
Nigeria   2.3  0.3  0.2  0 
Senegal   3.3  3.1  3.3  4.4 
South Africa   na  1.3  na  1.3 
Sudan   3.8  5  6.2  2.1 
Tanzania   na  4.3  6  8 
Togo   2.2  1.9  2.8  4.1 
Uganda   na  4.8  na  9.4 
Zambia   0.1  0.1  na  1.9 
Zimbabwe   na  na  3.3  6 
Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2008), compiled from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
a. Share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share 




Table 1.9: Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in primary agricultural 
production, African focus countries, 1965 to 2004  
(percent at undistorted prices) 
 
 (a) Exports as share of production 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Cameroon  11 14 16 23 29 33 20 21 17
Cote  d’Ivoire  48 44 42 39 50 61 55 60 59
Ghana  46 42 43 45 27 31 17 16 18
N i g e r i a   1 0 1 2  76221  11
S e n e g a l   2 4 1 8  47525  64
Ethiopia  na na    na na na na 1  3 2
Kenya  35 40 44 46 43 50 44 49 45
S u d a n  2 4 2 2   2 1 1 5975   63
Tanzania na na  na 18 18 16 16  11 7
Uganda  29 33 29 24 21 27 8 10 3
South Africa  15 14  16 27 26 20 11  6 10
Madagascar na na  Na 14 7 3 13  7 30
M o z a m b i q u e  88   1 0 1 1876   78
Z a m b i a   1 1 1 3  73244  6 1 4
Zimbabwe  63 36 43 37 43 41 52 53 43
E g y p t  1 7 1 5   1 59752   23
African focus 
countries 19 18  17 17 12 11 8  8 8
 
(b) Imports as share of apparent consumption 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    
    
Cameroon 0 0  00000  00
C o t e   d ’ I v o i r e   30  00001  11
G h a n a   33  01100  00
N i g e r i a   00  00110  01
S e n e g a l   22  30000  10
Ethiopia  na na    na na na na 1  1 2
K e n y a   1 3 1 0  1 1466 1 0  1 0 1 2
S u d a n   42  54432  13
T a n z a n i a   n a n a     n a  1411  44
U g a n d a   00  00111  11
S o u t h   A f r i c a   00  00000  11
Madagascar na na    na  5 6 14 35  11 28
M o z a m b i q u e   12  11134  43
Z a m b i a   22  7285 1 1  95
Z i m b a b w e   21  1020 1 2  69
E g y p t  6 6   61 42 22 01 5   1 61 4
African focus 





Table 1.9 cont. 
 
(c) Self-sufficiency ratio 
 
  1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    
    
Cameroon  113 117 119 130 141 150 125 126 120
Cote  d’Ivoire  186 178 173 166 206 268 223 251 253
Ghana  182 172 181 181 138 146 120 120 122
Nigeria  111 113 107 106 101 101 101 101 101
Senegal  129 121 100 108 105 102 105 106 104
Ethiopia na na    na  na 100 100 101  102 100
Kenya  135 153 162 182 166 192 165 178 163
Sudan  128 125 121 114 106 105 103 104 100
Tanzania  na na    na 121 118 119 117 108 103
Uganda  140 149 142 133 126 138 108 110 103
South  Africa  107 107 110 111 107 105 102 103 105
Madagascar  118 117 119 137 135 125 112 106 110
Mozambique na na    na  114 101 89 74  95 141
Zambia 110 113  101 101 94 99 92  97 113
Zimbabwe  264 161 176 160 174 170 301 204 169
Egypt 113 110  110 94 84 85 87  86 89
African focus 
countries  120 119 117 116 107 108 104 105 105
 
Source: Compiled using the project’s estimates of total agricultural production valued at 




Table 1.10: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a African focus countries, 1955 to 2004
c 
(percent)  
   Region  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Cameroon   W  na -2.9 -6.0 -7.4  -14.4  -11.2 -2.4 -1.1 -1.3 -0.1 
Cote d’Ivoire   W  na -23.5 -29.3 -28.1 -30.8 -32.2 -24.3 -19.5 -20.0 -24.5 
Egypt   N  -23.2 -33.9 -37.7 -37.5 -15.9  -9.2  56.6  -6.1  4.0  -6.1 
Ethiopia   E  na  na  na  na  na -17.5 -22.3 -24.4 -17.8 -11.2 
Ghana   W  -4.4 -9.0  -19.8  -14.9  -25.6  -21.2 -6.3 -1.7 -3.0 -1.4 
Kenya   E  26.6  23.0 9.7  -11.8  -1.7  -18.6  10.5  -5.8 2.4 9.3 
Madagascar   S  0.2  -5.9 -11.1 -13.5 -27.1 -38.8 -18.2  -5.4  -2.9  1.0 
Mozambique   S  na  na  na  na -34.5 -25.2 -32.0  -2.7  3.9  12.4 
Nigeria   W  na  20.7  11.9 6.7 6.3 9.4 8.2 3.9 0.4  -5.4 
Senegal   W  na -9.3 -7.2  -22.4  -22.7  -20.5  4.7  5.6 -6.1 -7.5 
South Africa   S  na 4.1 9.4  -0.7 3.8  22.9  11.7  10.8 5.7  -0.1 
Sudan   E  -11.7 -20.4 -31.8 -43.4 -24.3 -29.3 -35.4 -47.8 -24.5 -11.9 
Tanzania   E  na  na  na  na -41.8 -56.3 -45.3 -25.2 -23.2 -12.4 
Uganda   E  na -1.8 -3.1 -7.8  -17.6 -6.2 -6.8 -0.6  0.5  0.4 
Zambia   S  na  na -22.4 -15.8 -37.3  -2.7 -58.9 -30.8 -28.6 -28.5 
Zimbabwe   S  16.9 -27.2 -25.5 -26.0 -28.6 -24.0 -24.1 -24.9 -20.8 -38.7 
African focus countries: 
Unweighted average
b  -0.3 -7.8  -12.5  -12.9  -15.5  -13.7 -8.9 -8.7 -6.6 -6.0 
Weighted. average
a  -13.6 -7.7  -11.3  -14.7  -12.7 -7.9 -1.0 -8.9 -5.7 -7.3 
Dispersion of individual country NRAs 
c  20.8 13.4 15.1 14.3 17.1 21.2 29.5 16.1 12.3 13.5 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 
a. Weighted average for each country, including product-specific output and input distortions and non-product-specific assistance as well as 
authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; 
and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 16 countries of their national NRA (weighted) average NRAs.  





Table 1.11: Dispersion of nominal rates of assistance across covered agricultural products,




   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Cameroon   na 13.5 18.0 21.8 29.0 20.6 17.2 16.1 13.0  7.5 
Cote d’Ivoire   na 25.1 28.0 33.1 46.2 33.3 33.1 26.2 23.4 33.1 
Egypt   21.9 14.7 17.1 21.3 32.2 31.9 89.6 33.0 28.7 22.1 
Ethiopia   na  na  na  na  na 26.4 28.2 28.0 29.1 23.6 
Ghana   9.8 17.2 29.9 29.0 47.9 69.6 56.3 26.2 17.2 25.5 
Kenya   33.2 26.0 30.7 20.5 26.5 22.3 23.6 23.4 24.7 25.6 
Madagascar   na 31.3 24.7 24.6 37.5 39.2 42.0 39.1 30.3 22.5 
Mozambique   na  na  na  na 34.8 36.0 40.3 28.6 33.4 37.9 
Nigeria   na  112.9 95.4 94.2 89.9 92.0 94.4 83.2 72.7 53.2 
Senegal   na 20.3 16.1 33.5 44.5 38.2 58.8 67.1 14.3 18.6 
South Africa   25.7 17.9 19.1 25.3 31.6 42.7 35.0 31.8 20.3 20.3 
Sudan   34.2 34.9 34.1 36.2 40.0 31.7 54.4 75.3 41.2 63.2 
Tanzania   na  na  na  na 38.6 39.1 41.3 46.5 47.3 51.9 
Uganda   na  7.8 11.6 28.5 47.0 39.3 40.5  7.8  6.6  6.9 
Zambia   na 14.5 29.6 26.6 36.1 34.8 35.4 39.2 36.1 38.1 
Zimbabwe   74.6 71.0 47.3 36.9 27.7 28.1 24.4 25.2 25.3 33.9 
African focus countries: 
Unweighted average
b  33.2 31.3 30.9 33.2 40.6 39.1 44.7 37.3 29.0 30.2 
Product coverage 
c  68 73 72 72 70 67 66 66 66 68 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 
a. Dispersion for each country is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of NRAs across covered 
products each year. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 
1975-79 are 1976-79; and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 
b. The unweighted average is the simple average across the 16 countries of their 5-year simple average dispersion measures. 




Table 1.12: Nominal rates of assistance, key covered farm products, all African focus countries,




    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Banana  na -2 -4  0 -2 -1 -1  3  5  1 
Bean  na  6  2  -3 -39 -53 -66 -25 -24 -25 
Beef  -13 -21 -29 -37  4  11  23 -38  -1 -26 
Cassava  0 0 0 0 1 2 1  -1  -3  -3 
Cocoa  -14 -27 -54 -48 -60 -52 -36 -35 -32 -36 
Coffee  -11 -27 -36 -44 -62 -53 -42 -37 -21 -12 
Cotton  -16 -41 -53 -54 -49 -43 -31 -54 -38 -46 
Groundnut  -29 -27 -38 -51 -46 -44 -17 -30 -36 -40 
Maize  -4  12 3  -7  -12 1  38 8 2  -5 
Milk  -35 -22 -32 -42  -1 -22  67 -27  -8  15 
Millet  -77  -19 -6 -4 -1  1  0  1 -3 -2 
Palmoil  na -25 -31 -44 -17 -25 -12 108  41 -13 
Plantain  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry  na -13 -13 -16 -24  18  -3  6  13  3 
Rice  -62 -38 -39 -22 -14 -14  29  0  -8  -5 
Sesame  -40 -53 -64 -65 -68 -60 -48 -48 -50 -38 
Sheepmeat  -12 -14 -18 -22 -21 -20 -37 -49 -45 -21 
Sorghum  -35 62 87 49 28 17 41 37 23 21 
Soybean  na  na -14 -30 -43 -43 -40 -53 -50 -54 
Sugar  -22 -6 11  -24  -11 -1 42  2  7 44 
Sunflower  na  15  17 6 7  16 7 6  -6  -4 
Tea  3  9  -7 -20 -30 -34 -29 -40 -28 -16 
Tobacco  na -42 -38 -45 -54 -47 -48 -38 -34 -63 
Vanilla  na -62 -53 -39 -57 -76 -85 -78 -28 -13 
Wheat  -13  -27  -13 -6 12 -5 19  4  1 -1 
Yam  0 0 0 0 1 1 0  -1  -4  -3 
All covered products  -19.9  -13 -17.8 -22.1 -20.3 -12.1  0.9 -12.4  -6.6  -8.9 
 




Table 1.13: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, African region, 1955 to 2004  
(percent) 
 (a) (percent, unweighted averages)  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered  products  0.0 -14.5 -19.3 -20.2 -24.8 -20.5 -11.6 -13.3  -9.1  -8.9 
Non-covered products  0.6  1.0 -0.4 -0.8 -1.3 -1.5 -3.8 -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 
All agricultural products  -1.8 -10.0 -14.2 -14.7 -17.0 -15.4 -10.1 -10.7  -7.1  -6.5 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -0.3 -7.8  -12.5  -12.9  -15.5  -13.7 -8.9 -8.7 -6.6 -6.0 
Trade Bias Index
c  -0.11 -0.35 -0.40 -0.33 -0.41 -0.34 -0.41 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 
            
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All agricultural tradables
b  3.1 -10.9 -19.7 -20.6 -26.2 -21.5 -13.9 -13.9  -9.3  -9.4 
   All non-agricultural tradables  18.8 13.1 12.6 23.5 27.0 27.3 23.0 18.8 15.2 14.5 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
a  -13.2 -21.2 -28.7 -35.5 -41.8 -38.2 -29.7 -27.5 -21.2 -20.9 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate distortions:            
  Total agricultural NRA  7.0 -6.1 -8.4  -13.0  -13.6  -13.1 -7.6 -9.8 -8.5 -8.6 
  Trade bias index, all agric.  0.00 -0.16 -0.13 -0.03  0.11  0.29  0.45 -0.03 -0.03  1.31 
  Relative rate of assistance, RRA
a  -8.3 -17.1 -21.5 -27.8 -31.3 -28.7 -18.8 -23.8 -20.7 -19.6 
 (b) (percent, weighted averages)             
Covered  products  -19.9 -13.0 -17.8 -22.1 -20.3 -12.1  0.9 -12.4  -6.6  -8.9 
Non-covered products  0.5  3.6  1.8 -0.2 -0.3 -3.3 -7.6 -4.8 -5.1 -5.2 
All agricultural products  -14.0 -8.4  -12.2  -15.6  -13.8 -9.5 -2.0  -10.0 -6.1 -7.7 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -13.6 -7.7  -11.3  -14.7  -12.7 -7.9 -1.0 -8.9 -5.7 -7.3 
Trade Bias Index
c  0.00 -0.41 -0.45 -0.44 -0.50 -0.43 -0.60 -0.39 -0.33 -0.26 
            
Assistance to just tradables: 
   All agricultural tradables
b  -24.1 -13.3 -19.6 -25.0 -22.1 -13.5 -0.3  -15.4 -8.7  -12.0 
   All non-agricultural tradables  19.5 3.7 2.7 1.5 5.7 1.6 9.2 2.7 2.0 7.3 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
a  -36.5 -15.2 -21.4 -26.0 -25.9 -13.1  -8.3 -17.1 -10.4 -18.0 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate distortions:            
  Total agricultural NRA  -10.3 -5.2 -7.3  -11.6 -8.9 -3.7  5.6 -6.7 -5.6 -6.2 
  Trade bias index, all agric.  0.03 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.29 -0.05 -0.26 -0.01  0.30  0.20 
  Relative rate of assistance, RRA




Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts 
of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
b. NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary factors and intermediate inputs as a percentage of 
the total primary agricultural production valued at undistorted prices. 
c. Trade Bias Index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. The regional average TBI is calculated from the regional averages of the NRAs 




Table 1.14: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural exportables, import-competing products, and the trade bias index,
a African focus 
countries, 1955 to 2004                    (percent) 
 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Cameroon            
NRA agriculture exportables  na -16.4 -26.0 -28.9 -38.5 -28.5  -7.4  -4.7  -4.7  -1.1 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  na na na na na na na na na 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na  na na na na na na na 
Exportables  Share  na 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
C o t e   d ’ I v o i r e             
NRA agriculture exportables  na -47.2 -50.3 -48.7 -57.3 -57.9 -44.2 -47.9 -41.8 -46.3 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  13.7 -0.1 15.7 42.6 18.9 22.6 15.2 14.8 16.6 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.5  -0.50  -0.55 -0.70 -0.64 -0.54 -0.55 -0.49 -0.54 
Exportables  Share  na 77 76 78 82 81 84 76 75 78 
E g y p t             
NRA agriculture exportables  -31.5  -52.4  -62.4 -62.2 -43.4 -34.0  5.0 -30.9 -17.8 -29.7 
NRA agriculture import-competing  -34.3  -44.0  -44.6  -44.4 -5.5 -2.5  138.2  2.4 16.9 -0.8 
Trade  Bias  Index  0.05 -0.15 -0.32 -0.31 -0.39 -0.28 -0.55 -0.31 -0.29 -0.28 
Exportables  Share  48 49 51 47 46 35 38 34 32 28 
E t h i o p i a             
NRA agriculture exportables  na na na na na  -33.8 -44.9 -48.0 -40.0 -20.4 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  na na na na na na na na na 
Trade Bias Index  na  na  na  na na na na na na na 
Exportables  Share  na  na  na  na  na 100 100 100 100 100 
G h a n a               
NRA agriculture exportables  -14.9  -23.9  -54.5 -46.6 -74.4 -76.3 -53.3 -33.1 -19.4 -19.6 
NRA agriculture import-competing  9.8  15.4 10.8 11.7 27.2 44.6 53.4 26.7 17.5 28.3 
Trade  Bias  Index  -0.22 -0.34 -0.59 -0.53 -0.79 -0.84 -0.69 -0.47 -0.31 -0.37 
Exportables  Share  77 81 76 69 76 72 66 53 73 68 
K e n y a             
NRA agriculture exportables  25.5  16.8  3.3 -16.3  -2.3 -13.0 -14.0 -26.1 -10.1  -0.5 
NRA agriculture import-competing  12.3  2.4  4.2 -46.0 -25.3 -40.5  16.1  -35.4 2.9 9.3 
Trade Bias Index  0.1  0.2  0.09  0.64 0.48 0.57  -0.24 0.31  -0.12  -0.09 
Exportables  Share  88 75 72 77 88 76 87 54 57 55 
M a d a g a s c a r             
NRA agriculture exportables  0.0 -16.7 -22.5 -16.9 -60.1 -73.0 -62.2 -32.5 -18.0 -20.7 
NRA agriculture import-competing  17.7  20.4  13.0 -18.3 -19.6 -41.2 3.1 3.6 4.5 8.3 
Trade Bias Index  -0.15  -0.31  -0.27  0.14 -0.47 -0.53 -0.62 -0.34 -0.21 -0.27 





Table 1.14 (continued)  
 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
M o z a m b i q u e             
NRA agriculture exportables  na  na  na  na -73.3 -68.6 -76.4 -25.5  -3.1  -3.9 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  na  na  na -67.7 -63.6 -72.2  -5.2  29.5  57.7 
Trade  Bias  Index  na na na na  -0.05  0.08  0.38 -0.20 -0.25 -0.39 
Exportables  Share  na na na na 69 60 47 50 40 49 
N i g e r i a             
NRA agriculture exportables  na -34.3 -49.3 -57.2 -51.5 -43.0 -53.4 -24.3 -19.5 -18.5 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  216.4  176.8  152.4 87.8 67.2 92.8 39.7 28.9 -9.1 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.8  -0.82  -0.81 -0.74 -0.66 -0.70 -0.45 -0.36 -0.04 
Exportables  Share  na 65 65 58 54 41 42 28 31 24 
S e n e g a l             
NRA agriculture exportables  na -18.7 -16.6 -39.5 -42.5 -39.7  -9.1  -6.7 -13.5 -19.5 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  19.9 15.0 14.1 24.4 14.1 56.3 61.1  8.5 15.3 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.3  -0.27  -0.47 -0.54 -0.47 -0.42 -0.42 -0.20 -0.30 
Exportables  Share  na 84 80 84 84 79 73 76 75 76 
S o u t h   A f r i c a             
NRA agriculture exportables  39.9  2.7  8.2 -10.0  2.5  34.6  40.5 32.9 16.0  5.3 
NRA agriculture import-competing  10.1  2.7 8.6 5.1 7.7  26.3 1.1 0.1 2.8  -2.8 
Trade Bias Index  0.6  0.01  0.00  -0.14  -0.03 0.07 0.40 0.33 0.13 0.10 
Exportables  Share  34 51 42 56 55 42 35 30 31 35 
S u d a n             
NRA agriculture exportables  -21.9  -35.0  -43.1 -50.9 -37.5 -38.3 -57.8 -64.7 -41.4 -33.8 
NRA agriculture import-competing  19.6  19.6  -10.5  -34.6 23.8 -8.6 65.0  -20.4 -6.5 35.5 
Trade  Bias  Index  -0.3 -0.45 -0.36 -0.24 -0.46 -0.26 -0.74 -0.48 -0.35 -0.50 
Exportables  Share  83 81 79 81 84 81 85 75 63 71 
T a n z a n i a             
NRA agriculture exportables  na na na na  -68.8  -77.4 -75.4 -57.0 -43.8 -36.4 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  na  na  na -40.2 -50.4 -12.0  5.7 -12.2  2.4 
Trade  Bias  Index  na na na na  -0.43 -0.55 -0.71 -0.58 -0.29 -0.35 
Exportables  Share  na na na na 64 66 68 61 58 56 
U g a n d a             
NRA agriculture exportables  na  -8.4  -15.1  -43.4 -89.7 -66.2 -64.8  -9.4  -1.2  -0.2 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  15.2 20.6 42.2 79.9 54.8 58.2 15.1 13.9 14.8 
Trade  Bias  Index  na -0.20 -0.30 -0.58 -0.94 -0.77 -0.77 -0.21 -0.13 -0.13 





Table 1.14 (continued)  
 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Z a m b i a             
NRA agriculture exportables  na -23.4 -29.8 -46.4 -58.2 -47.7 -77.0 -57.7 -45.9 -51.4 
NRA agriculture import-competing  na  -2.3  -21.6 -41.8 -55.0 -23.0 -67.8 -53.7 -27.0 -10.1 
Trade Bias Index  na  -0.21  0.08  -0.06  -0.08 -0.30 -0.28 -0.08 -0.22 -0.46 
Exportables  Share  na 49 55 54 71 18 22 26 37 68 
Z i m b a b w e             
NRA agriculture exportables  23.9 -39.4 -36.8 -45.4 -55.8 -50.0 -44.2 -44.3 -34.8 -66.7 
NRA agriculture import-competing  26.8  -1.6  26.2  1.9 -24.6 -25.2 -17.0 -48.5 -52.5 -78.2 
Trade Bias Index  -0.01  -0.37  -0.50  -0.44 -0.40 -0.33 -0.31  0.13  0.45  0.83 
Exportables  Share  100 98 99 97 95 85 95 83 82 69 
            
All studied Africa, unweighted averages
b            
NRA agriculture exportables  -3.1  -22.7  -30.4 -30.5 -39.0 -35.2 -31.0 -24.1 -17.5 -17.6 
NRA agriculture import-competing  8.5  19.7  16.5 3.4 4.1  -2.1  17.8 0.3 2.2 4.6 
Trade  Bias  Index  -0.11 -0.35 -0.40 -0.33 -0.41 -0.34 -0.41 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 
            
All studied Africa, weighted averages
b            
NRA agriculture exportables  -20.6  -30.1  -38.4 -42.6 -42.6 -35.0 -36.7 -35.8 -26.1 -24.6 
NRA agriculture import-competing  -20.6  18.6 11.8  1.9 14.5 13.2  58.3 5.2 9.8 1.6 
Trade  Bias  Index  0.00 -0.41 -0.45 -0.44 -0.50 -0.43 -0.60 -0.39 -0.33 -0.26 
Exportables  Share  61 66 64 63 67 61 63 54 54 54 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 
a. Trade Bias Index, TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagx and NRAagm are the average percentage NRAs for the 
exportable and import-competing parts of the agricultural sector. The exportables share refers to the share of the gross value of production of 
tradables at undistorted prices that is due to the exportable sub-sector of agriculture. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and 
Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 
b. Regional averages of the trade bias index are calculated from the regional averages of the NRAs for exportable and import-competing parts of 




Table 1.15: Nominal rates of assistance for covered farm products, by policy instrument, all African focus countries,




   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Unweighted averages 
NRA, agric.inputs  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NRA, domestic market support  -1.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -0.8 -1.1 -1.2 -1.2 
NRA, border market support  1.3 -13.9 -18.7 -19.5 -23.8 -19.2 -10.8 -12.2  -7.9  -7.7 




NRA, agric. inputs  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
NRA, domestic market support  -2.1 -0.9 -0.7 -1.0 -1.6 -1.9 -2.1 -1.6 -2.8 -3.0 
NRA, border market support  -17.8 -12.2 -17.2 -21.3 -19.0 -10.9  2.8 -10.8  -3.9  -6.0 
NRA, agric. total  -19.9 -13.0 -17.8 -22.1 -20.3 -12.1  0.9 -12.4  -6.6  -8.9 
 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 
a. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; 
and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 1981-84. 




Table 1.16: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers, total and per farm worker, 
African focus countries,
a 1955 to 2004 
 
(a) Total (constant 2000 US$ million) 
 
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Benin  na na na -8 -4 -5 -3  -13  -17 -4 
Burkina Faso  na  na  na  -5 -11 -12  -5 -10 -13  0 
Cameroon  na  -83 -174 -263 -636 -274  -48  -33  -39  -4 
Chad  na  na  na -20 -25 -15  -2  -7  -8  -1 
Cote d'Ivoire  na -406 -603 -742  -2223  -1535  -1047 -752 -878 -911 
Egypt  -1561 -2472 -3348 -4153 -2046 -1204  5348  -582  354  -571 
Ethiopia  na na na na na  -1863  -2392  -2188  -2096  -1113 
Ghana  -103 -188 -350 -334 -727 -404  -91  -28  -78  -34 
Kenya  137  162  75 -134 -157 -408  168  -77  35  140 
Madagascar  2  -84 -185 -358 -555 -579 -239  -73  -39  10 
Mali  na  na  na -12 -28 -22 -11 -18 -31  2 
Mozambique  na na na na  -280  -198  -120  -20 51 55 
Nigeria  na 2193 1176  867  986 2198 1402  794  96  -1034 
Senegal  na  -76  -54 -234 -377 -220  45  37  -31  -42 
South Africa  na 186 500  -300 330  2067 853 841 456  14 
Sudan  -344  -686 -1200 -2547 -1861 -2373 -2984 -3633 -1848 -1210 
Tanzania  na na na na  -1525  -1062  -665  -322  -576  -330 
Togo  na na na -1 -2 -6 -4 -7 -7 -3 
Uganda  na  -36  -64 -199 -462 -144 -111  -12  18  14 
Zambia  na  na -149 -112 -388  -31 -396 -178 -197 -158 
Zimbabwe  39 -347 -305 -475 -779 -602 -533 -536 -467 -851 
African focus 





Table 1.16 continued 
 





















Benin  na na -8 -4 -4 -2 -9  -11 -3 
Burkina Faso  na na -2 -3 -3 -1 -2 -3  0 
Cameroon  -35 -71  -102  -241 -99 -16 -10 -11  -1 
Chad  na na  -12  -14 -7 -1 -3 -3  0 
Cote d'Ivoire  -275 -368 -402  -1072 -644 -382 -250 -280 -292 
Egypt  -363 -459 -535 -250 -144  672  -75  43  -67 
Ethiopia  na na na na na na  -107  -94  -45 
Ghana  -86 -149 -130 -248 -120  -23  -6  -15  -6 
Kenya  41  17 -27 -27  na  na  -8  3  11 
Madagascar  -34 -67  -116  -162  -151 -56 -15  -7  2 
Mali  na na -4 -9 -6 -3 -5 -7  0 
Mozambique  na na na  -53  -34  -21 -3  7  7 
Nigeria  174 86 60 69  153 96 54  6  -68 
Senegal  -55  -35 -137 -196 -103  19  14  -11  -13 
South Africa  75 197  -122 156  1097 442 440 250  8 
Sudan  -176 -292 -574 -381 -432 -482 -539 -255 -156 
Tanzania  na  na  na  -196  -121 -65 -27 -43 -22 
Togo  na na -2 -3 -7 -4 -7 -7 -2 
Uganda  -10 -15 -42 -88 -24 -16  -2  2  2 
Zambia  na -106  -71 -215  -15 -164  -65  -67  -52 
Zimbabwe  -225 -180 -249 -363 -244 -182 -161 -132 -237 
African focus countries   -29 -68  -120  -134 -77  -9 -55 -39 -41 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 
a. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 





Table 1.17: Gross subsidy equivalents of assistance to farmers in Africa, key covered products, 1955 to 2004 
 
(a) by product (constant 2000 $US millions) 
    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Banana  na -1 -1  0 -1  0 -1  7 10  1 
Bean  na  1  1  -3 -258 -232 -217  -58 -137 -134 
Beef  -152  -422  -813 -1512  26  425  1236 -2235  -43 -1549 
Cassava  na  4  5 10 49  182 43  -35  -307  -209 
Cocoa  -110 -421 -882  -1033  -2419  -1257 -833 -532 -731 -890 
Coffee  -12 -290 -496 -837  -3139  -1574  -1053 -452 -346  -82 
Cotton  -364 -1203 -1767 -2254 -2362 -1424  -947 -1569  -850  -858 
Groundnut  -27 -271 -501 -979  -1176 -881 -204 -385 -545 -640 
Maize  -28 306  65  -500  -723  49  1913 498 171  -417 
Milk  -337 -218 -350 -609  -10 -451 1019 -522 -254  374 
Millet  -106 -89 -95 -81 -25  17  -3  12 -66 -40 
Palmoil  na -117 -132 -154 -132  -96  -80  373  182  -89 
Plantain  na na na na na  0  0 -2 -4 -2 
Poultry  na -21 -35 -87  -267 190 -19  77 185  52 
Rice  -327 -379 -652 -884 -460 -333  549  0 -236 -133 
Sesame  -63  -98 -112 -243 -298 -210 -109  -80 -145  -73 
Sheepmeat  -75  -94 -148 -279 -323 -338 -490 -647 -595 -319 
Sorghum  -136  1113  1186  1008 685 409 704 613 496 330 
Soybean  na  na  -1  -2 -14 -22 -20 -20 -23 -19 
Sugar  -30  -31  70 -480 -356 -254  403  6  70  429 
Sunflower  na 8 6 1  11  23 6 8  -11  -5 
Tea  2  8  -10  -37 -154 -160 -134 -212 -179  -92 
Tobacco  na -306 -148 -143 -271 -215 -219 -223 -211 -315 
Vanilla  na -13 -13 -12 -17 -49 -80 -43  -9 -17 
Wheat  -80 -236  -91 -160  117 -132  632  166  49  -60 




Table 1.17 continued 
(b) by sub-sector (constant 2000 US$ billions) 
Total GSE, all direct assistance to farmers
a 
  
GSE for just 
covered farm 
products 
GSE for just 
non-covered 
farm 





1955-95  -1.9  0.0 -1.9 -1.1 -0.7  0.0 
1960-64  -2.9 0.4  -2.2  -4.0 1.5 0.0 
1965-69  -5.2 0.2  -4.7  -6.1 1.0 0.0 
1970-74  -9.5 0.0  -9.0  -9.6 0.1 0.0 
1975-79  -11.8 0.0  -10.5  -13.9 2.3  -0.2 
1980-84  -6.9 -0.8 -6.3 -9.5  2.1 -0.3 
1985-89  0.4 -1.8 -0.7 -9.5  8.6 -0.6 
1990-94  -6.4 -1.2 -6.8 -7.7  0.8 -0.7 
1995-99  -4.1 -1.6 -5.3 -6.3  2.0 -1.3 
2000-04  -5.0 -1.4 -6.0 -5.7  0.3 -1.0 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of 
this book. 










Table 1.18: Relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture,
a African focus countries,
e 1955 to 2004 
(percent)  
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Cameroon            
NRA agriculture  na -14.2 -24.7 -27.0 -36.9 -27.3 -5.2 -3.7 -4.2 -0.5 
NRA nonagriculture  na 18.4 22.8 25.9 29.8 29.4 24.7 19.1 18.3 14.9 
RRA  na -27.6 -38.5 -41.9 -51.0 -43.6 -23.1 -18.8 -19.0 -13.4 
Cote d’Ivoire   
NRA agriculture  na -32.9 -38.1 -35.0 -38.6 -42.9 -33.3 -32.7 -27.5 -32.5 
NRA nonagriculture  na 15.9 11.7 9.6 20.2 14.7 17.2 11.2 7.5 4.4 
RRA  na -42.1 -44.6 -40.7 -48.7 -50.2 -43.1 -39.5 -32.6 -35.4 
Egypt   
NRA agriculture  -33.1 -48.1 -53.6 -53.0 -23.2 -13.3 87.3 -9.1 5.9 -9.2 
NRA nonagriculture  31.2 42.3 44.2 40.3 23.5 17.4 20.9 25.5 25.2 24.5 
RRA  -49.0 -63.4 -67.8 -66.5 -37.8 -26.3 55.6 -27.3 -15.5 -27.0 
Ethiopia   
NRA agriculture  na na na na na -33.8 -44.9 -48.0 -40.0 -20.4 
NRA nonagriculture  na na na na na 40.2 51.3 44.5 20.8 10.5 
RRA  na na na na na -52.6 -63.4 -63.8 -49.8 -27.9 
Ghana   
NRA agriculture  -9.3 -16.6 -38.8 -28.9 -50.2 -39.9 -17.3 -5.7 -8.8 -3.3 
NRA nonagriculture  3.7 1.5 -0.3 2.7 -5.5 -0.1 1.0 3.8 3.4 5.2 
RRA  -12.5 -18.0 -38.4 -30.8 -47.5 -39.3 -18.7 -9.2 -11.7 -8.0 
Kenya            
NRA agriculture  41.5 37.7 15.7 -13.3 11.8 -6.5 20.3 -4.3 3.1 12.3 
NRA nonagriculture  20.0 21.9 29.2 24.5 20.0 33.2 28.3 18.0 13.8 10.3 
RRA  17.9 12.7 -10.4 -30.2 -6.9 -29.9 -6.1 -18.7 -9.3 1.9 
Madagascar   
NRA agriculture  1.4 -15.8 -24.4 -21.3 -41.6 -57.5 -38.1 -16.8 -8.3 1.5 
NRA nonagriculture  n a1 1 . 31 2 . 4 8 . 71 3 . 32 0 . 01 2 . 71 1 . 51 0 . 21 4 . 4  
RRA  na -26.0 -32.8 -27.6 -48.2 -64.2 -44.8 -25.4 -16.7 -11.3 
Mozambique   
NRA agriculture  na na na na -70.1 -67.3 -75.1 -15.4 16.3 26.0 
NRA nonagriculture  na na na na 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.2 23.1 
RRA  na na na na -76.7 -74.4 -80.6 -33.9 -9.4 2.4 




Table 1.18 (cont.) 
Nigeria            
NRA agriculture  na 54.4 30.5 18.7 19.2 41.8 24.8 20.7 14.9 -7.5 
NRA nonagriculture  na 1.4 1.1 -1.7 -2.9 -2.9 -2.2 -6.2 -9.0 -0.5 
RRA  na 52.3 29.0 20.8 22.6 45.6 27.4 28.8 26.2 -7.0 
Senegal   
NRA agriculture  na -12.7 -10.5 -30.9 -31.1 -28.0 8.2 9.7 -8.1 -10.9 
NRA nonagriculture  8 . 41 1 . 11 1 . 61 0 . 31 1 . 1 9 . 11 2 . 41 0 . 9 9 . 81 1 . 4  
RRA  na -21.4 -19.8 -37.4 -37.9 -34.1 -3.6 -1.0 -16.3 -20.1 
South Africa   
NRA agriculture  na 5.2 11.9 -0.7 5.2 31.7 17.5 14.6 7.9 0.4 
NRA nonagriculture  na 3.6 3.2 2.5 2.6 5.8 5.5 7.0 4.0 2.6 
RRA  na 1.5 8.4 -3.1 2.4 24.4 11.3 7.2 3.7 -2.2 
Sudan   
NRA agriculture  na -25.8 -36.4 -48.1 -28.0 -32.6 -38.5 -53.6 -28.8 -14.2 
NRA nonagriculture  0 . 9- 2 . 4- 5 . 6- 4 . 7- 6 . 7 1 . 5- 8 . 5 7 . 1 8 . 8 4 . 2  
RRA  na -23.4 -32.7 -45.6 -22.7 -33.5 -32.9 -55.4 -34.7 -17.5 
Tanzania   
NRA agriculture  na na na na -59.6 -68.2 -55.4 -32.3 -31.7 -20.1 
NRA nonagriculture  na na na na 35.5 69.9 39.8 16.6 11.9 10.3 
RRA  na na na na -70.3 -81.3 -68.1 -41.3 -38.9 -27.6 
Uganda   
NRA agriculture  na -4.6 -8.6 -24.3 -70.6 -22.8 -25.1 -1.3 4.0 3.6 
NRA nonagriculture  n a 9 . 61 9 . 43 4 . 96 8 . 15 3 . 65 2 . 92 1 . 63 1 . 02 6 . 1  
RRA  na -13.0 -23.1 -43.1 -82.1 -49.5 -50.6 -18.8 -20.6 -18.0 
Zambia   
NRA agriculture  na -22.4 -33.3 -44.4 -58.4 -27.6 -69.7 -55.2 -36.2 -36.7 
NRA nonagriculture  13.8 16.1 20.0 27.6 34.5 24.1 24.2 21.2 13.5 6.4 
RRA  na -33.2 -43.8 -56.2 -68.8 -41.4 -75.2 -62.6 -43.8 -40.5 
Zimbabwe   
NRA agriculture  23.9 -38.5 -45.6 -44.2 -54.5 -46.7 -42.9 -45.2 -40.0 -72.9 
NRA nonagriculture  26.0 29.1 30.8 37.8 48.1 46.9 42.2 35.9 20.9 20.2 
RRA  -1.7 -52.3 -58.3 -59.5 -69.1 -63.4 -59.8 -59.5 -50.6 -77.3 




Table 1.18 (cont.) 
All African countries, unweighted averages
b            
NRA agriculture  3.1 -10.9 -19.7 -20.6 -26.2 -21.5 -13.9 -13.9 -9.3 -9.4 
NRA nonagriculture  18.8 13.1 12.6 23.5 27.0 27.3 23.0 18.8 15.2 14.5 
RRA  -13.2 -21.2 -28.7 -35.5 -41.8 -38.2 -29.7 -27.5 -21.2 -20.9 
All African countries, weighted averages
c            
NRA agriculture  -24.1 -13.3 -19.5 -24.9 -22.0 -13.5 0.1 -15.3 -8.7 -11.9 
NRA nonagriculture  19.9 3.2 2.3 0.9 4.8 0.8 8.6 2.2 1.6 6.6 
RRA  -36.8 -14.8 -21.1 -25.6 -25.2 -12.5 -7.5 -16.6 -10.1 -17.4 
Dispersion of RRA
d  40.7 24.0 24.3 22.7 35.6 42.4 45.2 28.6 23.3 20.0 
Sources: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this book. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b. Simple averages of the above (weighted) national averages.  
c. Weighted averages of the above national averages, using weights based on gross value of national agricultural production at undistorted 
prices. 
d. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the standard deviation around a weighted mean of the national agricultural sector NRAs each year. 
e. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; 




Table 1.19: Relationships between nominal rates of assistance and some of its determinants,
c 
African focus countries, 1960 to 2004   
 
Explanatory 
variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
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(0.02) 
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(0.03) 



























              
R
2 
0.02 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.27 0.28 0.28 
No. of obs. 
5372 5372 3788 3838 5372 5372 3788 3838 5372 5372 3788 3838 
Country FE  No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE  No No No No No No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Source: Authors’ estimates 
a. Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in 
national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports (world=1). 
b. Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world=1). 
c. Dependent variable for regressions is NRA by commodity, country and year. Results are 
OLS estimates, with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels shown at the 




Table 1.20: Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered 
farm products,
a African focus countries, 1960 to 2004 
(percent, at primary product level) 
 
(a) aggregate CTEs by country, percent
e 
 
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Benin  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Burkina  Faso  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cameroon  -0.4 -0.7 -1.3 -3.7 -3.7 -1.1 -0.4 -0.2  0.0 
Chad  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cote  d'Ivoire  -9.4  -20.1 -8.4  3.8  -10.8 -3.9 -4.6 -4.3 -3.8 
Egypt  -47.1 -49.5 -49.6 -20.8 -12.3 109.5  -2.7  13.9  -2.8 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na -15.2 -17.6 -20.3 -12.1 -10.0 
Ghana  -2.1  -4.4  -2.5  -4.6 1.7  10.2 4.0 0.8 2.8 
Kenya  26.1 21.3  -12.8 20.7 26.0 14.8  -14.6 12.0 18.7 
Madagascar  -15.9 -22.1 -19.2 -26.2 -42.4 -13.4  -1.2  -1.9  4.0 
Mali  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mozambique  na  na  na -50.5 -39.6 -53.4  -3.6  5.5  31.1 
Nigeria  31.2  23.1  14.0 9.0 4.3  15.2 5.6 7.4 0.9 
Senegal  -10.8 -10.3 -30.2 -25.2 -18.3  32.0  31.9  -6.0  -7.0 
South  Africa  4.0  10.2  -0.2 6.7  29.8  14.7 8.6 6.6  -0.6 
Sudan  -15.2 -28.9 -41.8 -16.8 -24.2 -30.1 -47.7 -21.2  -5.2 
Tanzania  na  na  na -42.0 -53.7 -41.3 -17.5 -23.1  -8.8 
Togo  na  na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uganda  -1.0 -1.8 -1.1 -1.3  1.0 -0.9  0.3  1.7  1.3 
Zambia  -26.7 -38.5 -46.3 -54.3 -20.8 -68.0 -54.4 -30.5 -31.3 
Zimbabwe  -28.7 -35.4 -40.1 -53.7 -39.4 -37.1 -42.4 -36.6 -63.7 
African focus countries: 
  Unweighted average
  -7.4 -12.1 -13.3 -12.7 -10.4  -3.3  -7.6  -4.2  -3.6 
  Weighted average
b  -7.8  -11.8  -16.6 -8.7 -6.1 15.5 -8.2 -0.5 -3.2 
  Dispersion of national 
CTEs





Table 1.20 (continued): Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of 
covered farm products,
a African focus countries, 1955 to 2004 
(b) Regional CTEs by product, percent 
 
   1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Banana  -2  -4 0  -2  -1  -1 3 5 2 
Bean  6  2  -3 -37 -48 -64 -25 -24 -19 
Beef  -21  -28 -36  7  18  48 -32  6 -21 
Cassava  0  0 0  -1  -3  -1 1 3 3 
Cocoa  -31  -46 -43 -60 -48 -34 -20 -22 -34 
Coffee  -35  -41 -43 -59 -50 -46 -47 -37 -14 
Cotton  -46  -54 -55 -50 -43 -31 -55 -40 -58 
Groundnut  -22  -36 -47 -41 -39 -12 -26 -32 -36 
Maize  15  3 -3  1 10 48 10  4 -2 
Milk  -23  -32 -42  -1 -22  67 -27  -8  19 
Millet  -3  -4  -2 0 2 3 4 6 6 
Palmoil  -25  -31 -45 -19 -29 -13 107  41 -17 
Plantain  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poultry  -11  -11 -12 -24  18  -3  6  13  -2 
Rice  -27  -33 -16 -10  -9  41  9  2  10 
Sesame  -45  -56 -58 -61 -51 -38 -38 -40 -38 
Sheepmeat  -7  -13 -17 -14 -12 -32 -47 -36 -18 
Sorghum  102  94 73 56 34 69 68 38 40 
Soybean  na  -14 -32 -43 -43 -41 -53 -51 -56 
Sugar  -2  11 -16 -10  -6  54  -2  6  45 
Sunflower  19  17 6 8  19  13  13 0 1 
Tea  10  -6 -22 -46 -32 -27 -41 -40 -36 
Tobacco  -39  -38 -49 -57 -50 -50 -34 -37 -46 
Vanilla  na na na na na na na na na 
Wheat  -36  -22  -19  -2  -14  34 8 3  -1 
Yam  0  0 0  -1  -1 0 1 3 3 
All African focus 
c o u n t r i e s :            
  Weighted average
b  -8 -12 -17  -9  -6  16  -8  0  -3 
Dispersion of region’s  
    product CTEs
d  30.3 30.4 28.0 30.3 27.9 41.9 36.9 26.4 27.4 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this 
book. 
a. Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not 
including any input taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes).  
 b. Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is 
production plus imports net of exports plus change in stocks of the covered products. 
c. Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
national average CTE. 
d. Simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around a weighted mean of the 
regional average CTE for the covered products shown above. 
e. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 





Table 1.21: Value of consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of covered farm 
products, African focus countries,
a 1965 to 2004 
 
(constant 2000 US$ million at primary product level) 
 
(a) by country (constant 2000 US$ million) 
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Benin  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon  -12  -24  -57  -30 -8 -5 -3  0 
Chad  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire  -139 -65  39  -151 -54 -76 -63 -42 
Egypt  -2950  -3891  -2196  -1631 9315 -224 1087  -221 
Ethiopia  na  na  na -1014 -1435 -1427  -944  -759 
Ghana  -31  -33  -44 78  116 59 18 61 
Kenya  19  -71  282  241 75  -143 91  134 
Madagascar  -137  -321  -282  -386 -93  -9 -16  34 
Mali  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique  na  na -206 -183 -152  -19  58  164 
Nigeria  1338  1011 947 769  1495 755  1209 111 
Senegal  -51  -226  -334  -177 253 190 -32  -38 
South Africa  310  -145 323  1534 627 440 346  -14 
Sudan  -792 -1874  -898 -1557 -2136 -3073 -1265  -442 
Tanzania  na  na -993 -730 -393 -139 -397  -165 
Togo  na 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda  -24  -20  -25 46  -17  7 49 37 
Zambia  -160 -188 -310 -128 -214 -191 -136  -180 




  -2754 -6063 -4038 -3450  7138 -4126  -215  -1729 Table 1.21 (continued): Value of consumer tax equivalent of policies assisting producers of 
covered farm products, African focus countries, 1965 to 2004 
 
(b) by product (constant 2000 US$ million) 
 
   1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Banana  -1 0  -1 0  -1 6 8 0 
Bean  1  -3 -231 -211 -189  -54 -132 -127 
Beef  -787  -1415 176 908  2861  -2087 264  -1247 
Cassava  -5 -10 -50  -189 -43  33 293 200 
Cocoa  -15 -24  -118 -47 -38 -44 -82  -138 
Coffee  -68  -83 -111 -175 -223 -151 -146  -30 
Cotton  -1170 -1658 -2126 -1212  -742 -1401  -654  -756 
Groundnut  -360 -759 -889 -698 -135 -345 -486 -595 
Maize  67  -262  76 576  2497 627 306  -246 
Milk  -350 -609  -10 -451 1019 -522 -258  375 
Millet  -53  -33  6 26 40 58 89 80 
Palmoil  -116 -156 -148 -146  -95  387  185 -112 
Plantain  0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 
Poultry  -30 -70  -259 185 -17  83 206  61 
Rice  -506 -756 -347 -352  955  219  45  206 
Sesame  -45  -119  -155  -110 -47 -35 -42 -22 
Sheepmeat  -105 -232 -212 -187 -424 -662 -499 -106 
Sorghum  1223  1138 940 599 864 706 615 430 
Soybean  0  -1 -10 -24 -19 -22 -26 -23 
Sugar  52 -355 -345 -392  571  -32  60  521 
Sunflower  6  1 12 26 12 16  0  6 
Tea  -1  -4 -24 -24 -16 -20 -18 -15 
Tobacco  -65 -27 -74 -35 -39 -38 -14 -41 
Vanilla  na  0 -5 -8  -38 -9 -2  -17 
Wheat  -341 -528  -96 -837 2120  463  209  -49 
Yam  -4 -14 -37 -81 -13  30 249 179 
All covered 
products
b,c  -2754 -6063 -4038 -3450  7138 -4126  -215  -1729 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Chapters 2-17 of this 
book. 
a. Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia data under 1960-64 are 
1961-64; Tanzania data under 1975-79 are 1976-79; and Ethiopia data under 1980-84 are 
1981-84. Because of this, the totals in Tables (a) and (b) in these three time periods might not 
match exactly.  
b. These dollar amounts do not include non-covered farm products, which amount to almost 
one-third of agricultural output (see last row of Table 1.11), nor any mark-up that might be 
applied along the value chain. 
c. Includes also all the minor covered products not shown above. 